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NOTES
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND SOME REASONS FOR
TAKING AN ORAL AGREEMENT OUT OF ITS
OPERATION
The original statute of frauds, passed in the reign of
Charles II., 1676, enacts that: "N9 action shall be brought
. .... .to charge any person upon any agreement made
upon consideration of marriage, or upon any contract or sale
of land, etc., .. ..... unless the agreement upon which such
action be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall
be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith,
or some other person thereunto by him duly authorized."
The states of the United States that have passed statutes of
frauds have followed substantially the original English statute
both in its language and legal effect. Although the results have
shown us that this is true it might have been otherwise due to
different language used by a few of the states, namely, New
York, Michigan, Nebraska, Alabama, Iowa, California, North
Carolina, and Oregon, to the effect that, all contracts to sell or
convey any lands, etc.. ...... or any interest therein, etc.,
shaZl be void, unless such contract, etc., shall be put in writing,
signed by the party to be charged therewith, . . . etc." The
wording of the statute is similar in innesota to that of the above
mentioned states except as to actions upon agreements for mar-
riage in which it follows the English statute, saying, "no action
shall be brought."
Regardless of the number of states that have so changed
the wording of their statutes making the oral agreement void,'
the courts have ignored the fact and have construed such stat-
utes on the same basis and legal effect as those following the or-
iginal. The question is, how should we construe the statutes of
those states that have seen fit, or have taken it upon themselves
to change the wording in face of such a great amount of
precedently and common-law background? Were such changes
made only as a matter of form to be construed lightly or did the
sponsors of those changes realize their connotation and contem-
plate a strict adherence to the provisions? If we are to follow
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the latter line of reasoning and construe those statutes strictly,
then the question of part performance of a void contract is of
no consequence, being unenforceable either in law or equity.
This writer believes that a strict interpretation should be
given in those states that have made the change in the wording
of their statutes, due to the fact that he thinks that the sponsors
of those changes knew what they wanted and that they saw the
laxity of the enforcement of the original statute and wanted to
insert a condition that would have a tendency to make a closer
adherence to the meaning of the original statute as intended by
the authors. But, since the weight of authority is against this
view and practically all the cases have held contrary to this
view, we must turn to the consideration of how some other pro-
visions of the statute are construed.
There has been some controversy regarding the taking of
cases out of the operation of the statute where there has been
payment in whole or in part of the purchase price in sales of
realty.
It is now well settled that payment, even of the whole
amount of the purchase-money is not to be deemed part-per-
formance so as to justify a court of equity in enforcing the con-
tract.
The greatest reason for this conclusion is that the framers of
the statute having expressly provided that "payment in whole or
in-part shall be sufficient to exempt from its operation a contract
for the sale of goods, wares, or merchandise," they must be pre-
sumed to have intended that it should not be sufficient in cases
of contracts for the sale of lands; no such provision in favor of
the latter occurring in the statute. Having thus briefly consid-
ered the construction of the statute of frauds and its different
interpretation by the courts we now turn to the reasons for not
applying the statute to oral contracts for the sale, lease, etc., of
realty.
The reasons generally accepted for not applying the statute
in cases of such oral contracts are: (I) To prevent fraud; (II)
Where the purchaser would otherwise be a trespasser; (III) The
livery of seisin idea, or where possession is delivered; (IV) Equi-
table estoppel; and (V) Equitable fraud.
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Having considered the cases upholding these reasons we find
that such reasons are not considered as separate and distinct
grounds for the decisions but they are more or less coupled to-
gether as a basis for the holding in each case. However, this
writer has attempted to cite cases bearing out the particular rea-
son considered.
I. To PREVENT FRAuD
The purpose of the statute of frauds was to prevent frauds
and perjuries, so to allow the enforcement of the statute itself to
cause fraud upon one of the parties to an agreement within the
scope of the statute would be to defeat its primary purpose.
Probably the earliest case where an oral agreement was
taken out of the statute of frauds based upon a prevention of
fraud is cited in 5 Viner's Abridgment 523, and although no
name is given the author there states: " Where the statute of
frauds has been used to cover a fraud, the court has always
relieved. The first case in Lord Nottingham's time, where there
was an absolute conveyance and a defeasance, which the defend-
ant would not execute, but insisted on the statute, it was over-
ruled." The writer goes on to state that, "next after the rea-
son of fraud for taking the agreement out of the statute, in
Lord Jeffrey's time, is the putting one into possession under the
oral agreement-coupled with expenditure of money on improve-
ments. The bill was, to have a lease according to defendant's
promise, the plaintiff having laid out money in the premises,
and the defendant insists on the statute, there being no agree-
ment in writing. Held, defendant must execute the lease,
since he has stood by and aRlowed the plaintiff to spend his
money while in possession." The last case, although holding
possession plus making improvements is sufficient part perform-
ance to take the agreement out of the statute, seems to be more
influenced by the idea of fraud upon the lessee than the doc-
trine of part performance, and so indicates that the early cases
were based upon fraud more than they were upon the idea of
possession or part performance, which is in accord with the
writer's opinion as will be seen herein. The case of Foxcroft v.
Lister,1 decided 1701, is probably the earliest case of full record
12 Vern. 456, 1 Eng. Rep. 205 (1701).
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giving fraud as the reason for taking the oral agreement out of
the statute. There F and L agreed orally that F would execute
to L a ninty-nine year lease, L to have the privilege of building
a number of houses thereon. L entered and constructed the
houses mostly at his own expense, and later F becoming ill,
asked L. to draw up a written lease. L. did so, but the heirs-
to-be of F prevented F from signing the lease, and now after
F's death bring action to oust L under claim of the statute of
frauds. Here again we have the element of possession and
furthermore expenditures in making improvements, which are
held in some jurisdictions today sufficient part performance to
take the agreement out of the statute, but this decision was not
based upon such reasons. This case decided in 1701, was based
upon the idea of prevention of a fraud. The action of the
heirs-to-be of F in preventing the signing of the lease is a direct
attempt to invoke the provisions of the statute in order that L
may be deprived of his lease. This case is not only one of the
outstanding cases based upon fraud (actual) but is cited as
authority for the much extended doctrine of fraud today as
reason for taking an oral agreement out of the statute of frauds.
In the words of Dean Pound,2 "all decisions on 'fraud'
as a ground for taking cases out of the statute refer directly or
indirectly to the case of Halfpenny v. Ballet." 3 In that case,
on marriage to be had between plaintiff and the defendant's
daughter, an agreement that defendant would pay to plaintiff
a portion was reduced to writing, signed by the plaintiff7 and
delivered to defendant to be signed by him. Defendant refused
to sign and tore-up the agreement, saying he was not satisfied
with it. It was found that his objections were not to any
material parts and since defendant had consented to plaintiff
marrying his daughter, there was fraud upon the plaintiff by
failure of defendant to pay the portion as agreed. Although
the above quotation of Dean Pound's article may be correct in
part it is not wholly correct in that it is not in every case where
marriage is gained thru promises to be performed after the
marriage and it cannot be shown that the promisor did not in-
,tend to perform, that such case always presents actual fraud.
True, there is a change of position on part of the promisee, but
233 Harv. Law Review 933, at 937.
3 2 Vern. 373, Prec. Chan. 404 (1699).
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is it not true also that such change of position is made wholly
upon the faith of the word of honor of the one making the
promise? We find in the well known case of Montacute v.
Maxwell,4 a refusal to take an oral agreement out of the statute
where it was given as an inducement for the marriage and the
promisee relied upon the mere word of honor of the promisor.
In this writer's opinion the case cited by Dean Pound, above,
is more of a case of equitable estoppel or hardship than actual
fraud. If we allow the doctrine of equitable estoppel to enter
into marriage cases we would break down completely the pur-
pose of the statute.
"There is nothing to indicate that the statute was not in-
tended to apply in cases where its enforcement would place a
great hardship upon one of the parties, either by reason of
valuable improvemeints to the subject of agreed sale or where
the position of the parties had been changed so he could not be
restored to his former status. Exceptions have come about in
order to enforce the policy of the statute. Equity in her de-
light to do justice, ijil act to prevent a fraud. The great diffi-
culty in using it as a foundation for the doctrine of part per-
formance is that there is in reality no fraud in most cases." 5
It is not the purpose of this paper to show the different acts
required in the part-performance doctrine and how far such has
been accepted, but we find after a careful study of the subject
that in those jurisdictions accepting the doctrine of part per-
formance that in the majority of cases there must have been
sufficient acts or omissions on the part of both parties to consti-
tute a fraud upon the one before relief is allowed as against
enforcing the statute. This argument is suported by Clinan v.
Cooke 6 where it was held, "nothing is part performance that
does not put the party into a situation that is fraud upon him
if the agreement be not performed." Other cases in support of
this contention.7
The contention that fraud should be the only reason and the
foundation on whi]S the other so-called reasons "should rest re-
424 English Reports 54L (1720).
2 Texas L. Rev. 347, Coleman Gay.
0 9 Rev. Rep. 3 (1802).
eir v. Weir, 287 I1. 495 (1919); Greenlee v. Greenlee, 22 Penn.
225 (1853); Stites v. Keller, 6 Ham. (Ohio) 484 (1835); Moreland v.
Lemasters, 4 Black. (Ind.) 383 (1837).
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garding the taking of oral agreements out of the operation of
the statute of frauds, is very ably brought out by Browne, on
The Statute of Fraud, see. 448, at page 444.
"It is obvious that the mere circumstance that a verbal
agreement has been in part perforned, can afford no reason, such
as to control the action of any court, whether of law or equity,
for holding the parties bound to perform what remains ex-
ecutory. The doctrine of equity in such cases is, that where an
agreement has been so far executed by one with the tacit en-
couragement of the other, and relying upon his fulfillment of
it, that for the latter to repudiate it and shelter himself under
the provisions of the statute, would amount to a fraud upon the
former, that fraud will be defeated by compelling him to carry
out the agreement.'" It has been universally accepted that, if
actual fraud can be shown the courts will not hesitate to order
specific performance of the parol contract.
The contention of this writer is further supported by both
Mr. Justice Story and Mr. Pomeroy,8 in laying down the
ground of equitable interference in cases of part performance:
"The distinct ground upon which courts of equity interfere in
cases of this sort is that otherwise one party would be able to
practice a fraud upon the other, and it could never be that the
intention of the statute was to enable any party to commit such
a fraud with impunity."
II. WHERE TuE PURCHASER, PROmiSSEE, OR LEssEE, WoULD
OTHERWISE BE A TRESPASSER.
If the purchaser goes into possession and rests upon that
act his claim for the specific execution of the contract, the reason
assigned for allowing the claim is, that if there be no agreement
valid, in law or in equity, he is made a trespasser, and is liable
as a trespasser, a position which would amount to a fraud prac-
ticed upon him by the vendor. It is argued that in order to de-
fend himself against a charge as a trespasser in such case the
evidence of a parol agreement would seem to be admissible for
his protection, and if for such a purpose, there is no reason why
it should not be admnissible throughout.
"Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, see. 1293-4; Story's Equity Juris-
prudence, see. 754.
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This writer believes that, since the reason for prevention of
fraud as an element to take parol contracts out of the statute,
has been extended so far, there is no longer any necessity
of considering the fact of being a trespasser as one of the ele-
ments or reasons for nonenforcement of the statute. This
reasoning is substantiated by the opinion of the court in Lodge
v. Leverton,* "surely, if the court can, to prevent a fraud, de-
cree the performance of the contract, notwithstanding the stat-
ute, it can protect the defendant on the same ground against the
consequence of acts done under it, and at the instance of the
plaintiff. Delivery of possession might with more propriety be
treated as a license to enter and enjoy the rents and profits.
And such license surely would protect the purchaser against an
action for trespass or rents, when the contract of sale, through
default of the vendor, has not been carried out, or by reason of
the statute cannot be enforced." It is stated in H1am v. Good-
rick,9 "the part performance required to take the case out of
the operation of the statute of frauds must be such as to place
the party seeking the specific performance in the situation to
be held liable as a trespasser or wrong-doer, on account of acts
done in part execution of the agreement, and against which
liability he would be protected by its complete execution."
Sawyer, J., continues, "the ground thus distinctly presented for
the proceedings of a court of equity in decreeing specific per-
formance in such cases, is fraud; not merely of that nature which
may be said to exist in every case for a refusal to fulfill an agree-
ment after having received the consideration, but which con-
sists in placing the other party in a situation to be held liable as
a wrong-doer or in some other way of being made the -victim
of a fraud, or of an injury in the nature of a fraud." Another
case based on the same reason.10
Although the element of "otherwise a trespasser" may be
present in the early case of Foxcroft v. Lister, supra, the de-
cision is based upon the desire of the court to prevent fraud to
the lessee. So we see that although the element, of "otherwise
a trespasser or wrong-doer" may be present in the cases that it is
used mostly as a basis for showing fraud upon the one party if
the specific performance is not allowed.
* 42 Texas Reports 18, at 32 (1875).
'33 New Hampshire 32 (1856).
OUnderhM v. Williams, 7 Black. (Ind.) 125 at 126 (1844).
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This line of reasoning is supported by the attitude of many
American states in requiring more than the act of being put
into possession (altho coupled with resulting hardships) to take
the oral agreement out of operation of the statute.
III. Ti LivEay OF SEISIN DOCTRINE, OR WHERE PossEssIoN
HIAS BEEN PASSED PURSUANT TO THE ORAL AGREEMENT.
Putting the purchaser into possession was taken to be the
substance of a common-law conveyance. As a result of the
broadening of such a doctrine courts have allowed cases to be
taken out of the statute of frauds: on possession alone being de-
livered to lessee or vendee; on possession coupled with improve-
ments to the property; on possession when joined by circum-
stances of great hardship; -where acts show a change in character
of pre-existing possession (lease cases) ; and in cases where it is
not possible 'to take possession but relief is given on theory of
fraud or some irreparable injury. Although suggested by Dean
Pound." that it is only in cases where there is no possibility of
possession that equity is willing to rely wholly upon theories of
"fraud," it seems to this writer that it is in those cases where
possession is handed over that we find one of the strongest
points for upholding the doctrines of "fraud" (actual) and
"equitable fraud" as reasons for taking an oral agreement out
of the statute.
Possession may increase the magnitude of the fraud, i. e.
where one goes into possession of the land under an oral con-
tract of sale or lease, the vendor or lessor should not only be
estopped from claiming protection of the statute but it would
be fraud upon the one in possession since land is unique as a
general rule and the vendee cannot be made whole again. This
illustration at first blush may seem to be an argument in favor
of the livery of seisin idea, but by way of further explanation
of the idea that possession increases the fraud or is merely an
instrument of fraud: suppose C upon faith of B's possession
of the land in question contracts to sell B the adjoining fifty
acres of land which C owns, which is of little value taken by
itself, but with that of which B has possession its value is greatly
increased. Clearly damages would not be adequate compensa-
tion to B.
33 Harvard Law Review 937.
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So we see that the most favorable reason we can find from
the fact of possession, for taking the oral agreement out of the
statute, is that the delivery of possession in itself constitutes a
fraud upon not only the promisee but on others who rely upon
the fact that the promisee is in possession.
Why should we follow the old doctrine of livery of seisin
simply because some early cases may have been influenced by
the common-law form of conveyaneing?
True, we find the case of Butcher v. Stapley, and a very
few others seemingly decided upon livery of seisin or possession
idea, but this is not unusual considered in light of the circum-
stances of the time of passage of the statute and the fact that the
form of conveyancing before the statute was by livery of seisin.
The situation is nicely summed up in the language of Lowrie,
J., in Poorman v. Hilgore,1 3 "The customs of the country can
never be suddenly and entirely broken down, even by an act of
Parliment. It was natural that many cases should arise founded
on the old customs, where great injustice would be done unless
the statute should receive an equitable interpretation. But
exceptions founded on this principle must naturally be but
temporary expedients, which must die away when the new law
itself has become part of the general customs of the country."
We might reasonably allow some fifty years for the idea of
livery of seisin in the minds of the people to be replaced by the
requirements of the statute, but the statute having been passed
over two hundred and fifty years ago the custom of conveyanc-
ing of that time should no longer influence the courts in taking
an oral agreement for transfer of land out of the statute.
It is found on review of some of the authorities given by
Dean Pound in the above referred to article (see 11) as support-
his contentions on the "possession or livery of seisin idea," that
most of those cases h-ave been based upon other elements coupled
with possession which authorize the decree.
We see in Rector v. KeattsI4 the decision is strengthened
by the added facts of repairs and improvements being made by
one going into possession. The court further states, "not to de-
cree specific performance in such case would be to practice fraud
121 Vern. 363 (1685).
1326 Penn. St. Rep. 365 at 370-holding delivery of possession along
not sufficient to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds.
"1 Ark. Rep. 391 (1839).
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upon the one having gone into possession." We also see in an-
other case cited by Dean Pound, Bennett v. Dyer,'5 where one
was induced to take possession of land under a written agree-
ment which was not signed due to refusal of the attorney of
plaintiff to say the title was good, as agreed. Possession alone
was not here sufficient but the fact of estoppel being added made
it sufficient.
In a great number of the states mere passage of possession
is not sufficient to take an oral agreement out of the statute but
relief is given upon basis of "fraud," "equitable fraud" or
"equitable estoppel." This is seen in the case of Lodge v.
Leverton,16 where Moore, J., said, "the mere naked transfer of
possession of land can hardly be sufficient to justify a court of
equity in enforcing the specific performance of an oral con-
tract for purchase of a freehold."
IV. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
Although the same results are reached in cases where
"equitable fraud" and "equitable estoppel" are con§idered
the basis of taking the oral agreement out of the operation of the
statute of frauds, i. e., in either case a virtual fraud is worked
upon the vendee or promisee due to failure of performance on
part of the vendor or promisor. However, this writer will con-
sider the two reasons separately in so far as possible.
The name "equitable estoppel" has been given to those
cases where the vendor or lessor has by his own acts placed the
vendee or lessee in such a position with regard to the oral agree-
ment that there would be a fraud worked upon the vendee or les-
see and the vendor or lessor is- estopped from setting up the
lack of written agreement and claiming the protection of the
statute. The doctrine is said to have originated in England in
1837, in the case of Pickard v. Sears17 The first case in America
is supposed to be about the same time; Welland Canal Go. v.
Hathway 18
"35 Atl. Rep. 1004 (1896).
1642 Texas 18 (1875).
"6 Ad. & E. 469, 112 Eng. Rep. 179 (1837). In sale of plaintiff's
goods in possession of third party, to defendant; if plaintiff consented
to sale will be estopped to claim statute.
8 Wend. 480 (1838).
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The doctrine as stated in Gallagher v. Gallagher 19 lays
down as one of the three elements that must be present before
an oral agreement will be taken out of the operation of the
statute, "the contract must have been so far executed that a
refusal to complete it would operate as a fraud upon the pur-
chaser and place him in a situation in which he could not
be adequately compensated in damages." This requisite, though
generally accepted, may be construed to mean that actual fraud
is necessary, but it seems to this writer that the obvious meaning
of such statement is that relief will be granted in cases of equit-
able fraud or equitable estoppel. Holt, J., in Miller v. Lorentz20
citing Gallagher v. Gallagher, says, "Judge Snyder has clearly
and accurately summed up the doctrine, and placed it on its
true foundation of estoppel, against the commission of a fraud
by the vendor, such estoppel to be airmatively enforced in a
court of equity in favor of the vendee."
Holt, J., continues, "although the case Butcher v.
Stapely 21 has been cited by many writers and judges as based
upon the theory of possession, the lord chancellor declared that,
inasmuch as possession was delivered according to the agree-
ment, he took the bargain to be executed, and the doctrine was
rested upon the ground that the vendor was in such case.
estopped from the perpetration of a fraud under cover of the
statute by conveying to another or refusing to complete the
sale of the land."
The general doctrine would seem to rest upon estoppel
against committing a fraud, -where the part performance is such
as makes a visible transfer of the ownership pointing unmis-
takably to some contract, as well as to the vital point of its
execution in the transfer of possession of the land, the value
of which usually consists in its use and enjoyment, and which
puts the purchaser in a position of prima facie owner, and being
notice of his claim to all subsequent purchasers.
In the case of Malins v. Brouw et al 22 we see a very good
illustration of the equitable estoppel doctrine.
"31 W. Va. 9: 5 S. E. 297 (1888).
"19 S. E. 391 at 395 (1894).
='See (12) supra.
4 N. Y. 403 (1850). The mortgagor agrees to sell; the mortgagee
agrees to release, and upon these conditions the purchaser agrees to
buy. The purchaser pays whole amount including mortgage and is let
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The ground of relief in equity, said Chancellor Kent, .in
Parkhurst v. Cortlacndt,23 "is the fraud permitting a parol
agreement to be partly executed and in leading on a party to
spend money in the amelioration of the estate and then to with-
draw from performance of the contract."
The court in Seymore v. Oelrichs,24 in following the
doctrine of equitable estoppel stated, "the doctrine that equity
will hold one estopped from relying on the statute of frauds
where to do so will amount to the practice of fraud, is not at all
limited in its operation to any particular class of contracts but
applies in every transaction where the statute is involved."
Roberts on Frauds, page 132, states, "there does not seem
indeed to be any satisfactory foundation for the doctrine of part
performance without the intermixture of fraud, and upon this
ground where an owner has encouraged another to go on with
his improvements on the estate under a false expectation of a
conveyance, or lease, raised in him by the assurance of the party
entitled, it is agreeable to the general course of equitable relief
to disappoint the contrivance, by compelling the deceiver to
realize the expectation he has created."
We are further enlightened as to the extent the courts have
accepted the equitable estoppel doctrine in the case of City of
Chicago v. Gage,25 also in Morrison v. Herriek.26  Munday v.
Jolife,27 is considered one of the earliest and most outstanding
eases in support of the equitable estoppel doctrine. The Lord
Chancellor Cottenham, at p. 338: "Courts of equity exercise
their jurisdiction in decreeing specific performance of verbal
agreements, where there has been part performance, for the pur-
pose of preventing great injustice which would arise from per-
mitting a party to escape from the engagements he has entered
into, upon ground of statute of frauds, after the other party
into possession. Morigagee later refuses to release. Held mortgagee
by acceptance of money is estopped from setting up statute.
1 Johns. Chan. 273 (1814).
24156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909).
2"The ground of equitable relief in this class of cases Is of a much
broader character, more especially as it is applied in later years. It
proceeds upon the broad ground of equitable estoppel or estoppel by
conduct, as it is sometimes termed; a principle of modern growth which
is being extended from year to year in the courts.2027 IIl. App. 339 (1888).
I, 5 M. Y. & C. R. 167, 41 Eng. Rep. 334 (1839).
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to the contract has, upon the faith of such engagement, expended
his money or otherwise acted in execution of the agreement."
As is seen by the summary of authorities and cases on this
aspect of the subject this writer contends that the element of
estoppel should be considered in all cases possible, but that does
not mean that he thinks that in every case where there is even a
small amount of estoppel that the doctrine should apply. There
should be enough acts or omissions on part of the one party to
work a fraud on the other if statute is applied, and the amount
will have to be determined in each case.
V. EQUITABLE FRAUD.
As has been said before there is not a great deal of differ-
ence between equitable fraud and equitable estoppel, both reach-
ing the same result, i. e., a virtual fraud upon one party to the
oral contract. But there is a difference that may be well worth
considering. As seen in consideration of equitable estoppel, we
looked for the acts of the vendor or lessor which would estop
him from setting up the statute, but in our consideration of the
equitable fraud idea, we must look for and ascertain the neces-
sary acts of the vendee or lessee which, having been performed
on his part, there would result a fraud upon him were the
vendor or lessor to refuse to perform his part of the contract.
The whole law aplicable to these cases was correctly laid
down in Morphett v. Jones.28
Pomeroy, referring to the statute of frauds, says, "de-
signed to prevent fraud, it shall not be permitted to work a
fraud. This principle lies at the basis of the doctrine concern-
ing part performance, but it is also enforced where'er tt is
necessary to secure equitable results." 'However, the same
writer further states, "mere denial of an oral agreement or a
refusal to perform will not be sufficient to prove fraud."
The ground of equity intervention is well illustrated in the
case of Keatts v. Rector,29 where the rule is, as stated by Lacy,
J., "where the party seeking relief has been placed by the con-
21 Swan. 172, 36 Eng. Rep. 344 (1818). Where, on oral agreement
for lease for years, the lessee entered, and before any lease given a sub-
sequent agreement made by which part of land was given up, and lessee
continued In possession of residue at a reduced rent. Bill prayed agree-
ment be performed. After stating ground of relief as fraud, master of
rolls says: "A party who has permitted another to perform acts on
faith of an agreement shall not insist that the agreement was void."
I Ark. 391, at 419 (1839).
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tract in such a situation that he cannot be put in status quo
without injury, by reason of performing his part of the agree-
ment; and whenever that is the case courts of equity will inter-
fere for the purpose of preventing a fraud and decree specific
execution. If this were not the case courts of equity would
permit the forms of law to be made instruments of injustice for
the unconscientious purpose of committing a fraud upon a con-
fiding and innocent persona."
Dean v. Izard,30 decided in 1683, is one of the earliest cases
based on equitable fraud.
The doctrine of equitable fraud as a reason for taking an
oral agreement out of the statute of frauds is further substan-
tiated in the application made by the statutes in America. As
given by Paine, J., in Daniels v. Lewis 31 "equity enforces
verbal agreements for the sale of lands where there has been
such a part performance that it must necessarily produce a
wrong and an injury to one of the parties, if the other is then
allowed to repudiate it."
This power is expressly given by some of the statutes of the
states, Wisconsin being one of those states that has reserved in
its statute the power to prevent its operation where such will
cause fraud upon one party.
We see to what extent the doctrine has been applied in the
case of Barbonr v. Barbour.32
In the final analysis the question may be asked, is there any
actual distinction which may be supported between the doctrine
"equitable estoppel" and "equitable fraud?"
201 Vern. 159, 23 Eng. Rep. 385 (1683). In confidence of agree-
ments for leases of houses plaintiffs expended great sums of money in
and about the premises. Was held, this was a fraud upon plaintiff to
refuse to execute the leases since he could not be made entirely whole
again.
16- Wisc. 146 at 148 (1862).
249 N. J. Eq. 429 (1873).
The, wife had brought an action for divorce and the husband had
confessed -the alleged adultery. The latter went to the wife who had
gone to her mother, and he promised her that If she would drop the
action and come back to him that he would convey to her the house
they had lived in. The wife consented and withdrew the action and
went .back to him, but the husband did not convey so now the wife
sues for specific performance. Decree in favor of wife on grounds of
fraud upon the wife in that she could not be put in same position as
before -the agreement.
STATUTE Or FRAU)S
As pointed out p. 14 supra, the name "equitable estoppel"
has been given to those cases where the vendor has by his own
acts placed the vendee in such a position -with regard to the
oral agreement that a fraud would result upon the vendee if the
agreement is not carried out. It has also been pointed out p.
18 supra, we find the example of "equitable fraud," (see note
29 supra) "where the party seeking relief has been placed by
the contract in such a position that he cannot be put in status
quo without injury, by reason of performance of his part of the
agreement, equity will intervene for the purpose of preventing
fraud."
The argument is presented by Joyce Cox,33 "that there
must exist an estoppel against the defendant before equity will
intervene." That writer immediately softens the force of his
statement, saying, "the defendant must be held in some way
morally responsible for the hardship of plaintiff's situation be-
fore equity will intervene." .Quoting further, p. 56, ".....
denial of the contract's validity would work a material hard-
ship upon him, and in such a manner that the other party
knew, or ought to have known, that the parol agreement was
being relied upon with such result." It is herein that the dis-
tinction, as this writer sees it, exists. By way of illustration: A
agrees orally to convey Blackaere to B and B goes into pos-
session. Soon afterwards A goes to Europe and remains six
months. While he is away B, without the knowledge of A,
builds a twelve-room house on the land and when A returns B
demands a deed, but A refuses and insists upon the statute of
frauds. Can we contend A's refusal to give the deed is not a
fraud upon B ? If the fraud exists, are there sufficient acts on
part of A upon which B has relied that we can hold A estopped
from insisting on the statute ? We readily see that A has not
knowingly stood by and allowed B to build the house so we do
not have sufficient ground to hold A estopped by his own acts
from the insistence upon the statute. Nevertheless the fraud
is still there if the agreement is not carried out, so we are con-
fronted with the type of case where the vendee has so changed
his position in performance of his part of the agreement without
the knowledge of the vendor, that if the agreement is not
33 6 Texas Law Review at page 55.
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enforced a material hardship or virtual fraud is worked upon
the vendee.
It is this line of cases that fall within the "equitable fraud"
doctrine, and altho we cannot hold A estopped from setting up
the statute it may be presumed that he should have reasonably
anticipated that B would change his position in some similar
manner in reliance upon the agreement, the results of which
would cause exceedingly great hardship on him if the agreement
were not enforced.
Having considered the various acts of part performance
as elements constituting the fraud, we are able to see the fraud
more plainly in the cases falling within the "equitable fraud"
doctrine.
The effect and feasibility of such extension in taking oral
agreements out of operation of the statute of frauds is con-
sidered by Brown, 34 thus: "It is the decided inclination of the
judicial mind to be against extending, beyond those limits to
which it has been carried by clear authority, the doctrine of
enforcing oral agreements in equity upon the ground of part
performance."
Lord Redesdale remarks, "The statute was made for the
purpose of preventing perjuries and frauds, and nothing can be
more manifest to any person who has been in the habit of prac-
tising in courts of equity than that the relaxation of that statute
has been a ground of much perjury and much fraud." Brown
continues: "It is therefore absolutely necessary for courts of
equity to make a stand and not carry the decisions farther."
As has been seen throughout this paper, it is the view of
this writer that parol agreements as under consideration should
only be taken out of operation of the statute in cases of actual
fraud and the more palpable cases of equitable estoppel and
equitable fraud. The theory of part performanc by way of
possession through livery of seisin, by payment of purchase
price and the valuable improvements, should all be considered
as elements going to make up the presence of the fraud.3 5
As suggested in the consideration of equitable estoppel, the
Brown on Statute of Frauds, p. 492.
"Roberts on Frauds, p. 131: "There is no satisfactory foundation
for the doctrine of part performance, without the intermixture of fraud."
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amount of fraud in such cases as well as in those of equitable
fraud must be determined from the particular facts in each case.
Taking the extension of the exemptions from the operation
of the statute in general, this writer would suggest a more strict
adherence to the word of the statute, since the spirit and inten-
tion, in so far as a prevention of fraud is eoncerned, has been
carried far enough, and in some cases possibly too far.
A. JoB, Asm.
